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CHAPTER 11 
 
INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES: 
HOW INVESTMENT CONTRACTS CAN ACHIEVE PROTECTION 
 
ANIL YILMAZ-VASTARDIS and TARA VAN HO 
 
1. Introduction    
States are in a unique position to regulate each and every activity of business enterprises 
operating in the extractive industries.1 International law recognizes that states have 
permanent sovereignty over the natural resources located within their territories.2 As a 
result of this, businesses generally cannot operate in the extractives sector without 
obtaining permits and authorizations from the host state and are required to operate 
within the parameters of the terms of their investment contracts and the laws applicable 
to their activities. This gives host states ample opportunity to structure the legal 
framework applicable3 to the investments in the extractives sector in a manner that 
realizes their duty to protect human rights. However, states are often encouraged to 
make their regulatory framework as attractive as possible to outside investors.4 Laws 
                                                          
1
 According to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, extractive industries comprise of oil, gas 
and mining sectors, see http://www.miga.org/sectors/index.cfm?stid=1813 
2
 UN General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, “Permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources”; ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports, 2005, at para.244; N. Schrijver, 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 
para.1; M. Sornarajah, The International Law On Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press, 3rd 
ed., 2010) 40.  
3
 This legal framework includes, but is not limited to, investment laws, treaties and contracts, licenses and 
permits, national laws and regulations applicable to businesses operating in the extractive industries. 
4
 T. H. Cheng, Power, “Authority and International Investment Law”, American University International 
Law Review 2004-2005, 465, 500. 
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applicable to foreign investments (hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘FIL’)5 are 
often designed with the sole purpose of promoting foreign investments, without placing 
any obligations over investors, in order to increase global economic growth and act as a 
tool for development.  
The concessions provided to foreign investors under the FIL framework may 
place significant obstacles to states’ ability to implement their duty to protect human 
rights.6 Whether favourable legal frameworks for investment in fact increase 
international investment flows and whether foreign investment contributes to economic 
development of the host state are often debated.7 This is more so in the extractive 
industries, where the location of the valuable resources is considered the primary 
determinant of investment decisions.8 There is no empirical evidence that higher 
environmental standards and human rights compliance deters foreign investments in the 
extractive industries.9  
This paper considers how states can integrate their human rights obligations into 
investment contracts as a means of minimizing the adverse effects of business activities 
related to the extractives sector on human rights. The first two parts establish the 
theoretical background and the legal framework within which the concrete proposals in 
the final part are discussed. The analysis will begin with how the permanent sovereignty 
                                                          
5
 In the context of this paper, FIL is understood in a narrow sense to comprise of investment treaties and 
the investment contracts between the state and the investor. In a broader sense, FIL would also comprise 
of national law provisions on foreign investment promotion, terms of the investment license and permit 
etc., as any of these instruments may be taken into consideration when a dispute is submitted to an 
international arbitration tribunal or a local court by an investor against the host state. It is important that 
all these instruments include necessary provisions to ensure social and environmental protection; 
however, the focus of this paper will solely be on investment contracts. 
6
 See, e.g., ICSID, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A., 
Decision on Liability of 30 July 2010, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, para 262. 
7
 Sornarajah, The International Law On Foreign Investment op.cit., 57. 
8
 J. P. Walsh and J. Yu, “Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Sectoral and Institutional 
Approach”, IMF Working Paper, WP/10/187, at 21. 
9
 See, Y. Xing and C. D. Kolstad, “Do Lax Environmental Regulations Attract Foreign Investment?”, 
Environmental Resource and Economics 2002, 1, 22. Studies specific to human rights found different 
results on the relationship between human rights and FDI. Compare, e.g., S. L. Blanton and R. G. 
Blanton, “What Attracts Foreign Investors? An Examination of Human Rights and Foreign Direct 
Investment”, Journal of Politics 2007, 143, 152; J. P. Tumman and C. F. Emmert, “The Political 
Economy of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America, 1979-1993”, Latin America Research 
Review 2004, 49.  
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principle enables host states10 to utilize the legal instruments applicable to investor 
conduct to fulfill their duty to protect under international human rights law (‘IHRL’) in 
the extractive industries.11 For this purpose, Section 2 considers the theoretical 
understanding of international law as both an expression and constraint on sovereignty. 
It treats the discourses in international investment law and international human rights 
law separately before considering how the two fields interact.  
This paper further aims to contribute to the discussion on the implementation of 
state duty to protect in the extractive industries in light of the 2011 UN Guiding 
Principles on business and human rights, formulated by for UN Special Representative 
John Ruggie, (alternatively ‘UN Guiding Principles’ and ‘UNGPs’).12 In Section III, it 
considers the expectations of the UN Guiding Principles for states in adopting 
investment contract provisions that are consistent with a human rights approach. It 
suggests that the UNGPs place an expectation on states to ensure the laws and contracts 
include adequate and appropriate remedies and terms of liability for when violations 
occur despite proper due diligence measures by businesses. It is also important that the 
host state puts in place efficient enforcement mechanisms to ensure proper 
implementation of the protections and guarantees integrated into these instruments.  
In Section IV, the Qara Zaghan Gold Mining contract between the Government 
of Afghanistan and Afghan Krystal Natural Resources Company (AKNR) for 
exploitation of the gold mine in the Qara Zaghan region in Afghanistan will be analysed 
as a case study.13 The focus, when analyzing this contract, is on impact of the 
investment on the local communities’ right to land and right to an adequate standard of 
                                                          
10
 Under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights both host and home states carry the 
duty to protect. The focus of this paper; however, is only on the host states’ duty to protect; See John 
Ruggie: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (2011). 
11
 This should be distinguished from the discussion on whether the principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources should prevail in the face of investment protections. On that discussion, see, D. E. 
Vielleville and B.S. Vasani, “Sovereignty over Natural Resources versus Rights Under Investment 
Contracts: Which One Prevails?”, Transnational Dispute Management 2008, 21. 
12
 Guiding Principles, supra n. 10. 
13
 A copy of this contract is available on the website of the Afghanistan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. 
See, http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/QaraZaghan-Contract-2.pdf   
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living. The analysis draws on the authors’ collective experience advising states, 
intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations on the 
appropriateness of legislation and contracts relating to the extractive industry 
development. We argue that for a state to meet its human rights obligations, it must 
incorporate human rights in its investment contracts.  The recommendations include 
requiring impact assessments and community engagement, and introducing articles 
aimed at protecting the state’s continuing sovereignty in the area of human rights 
regulations. 
 
2. International Law as Sovereign Expression and Constraint  
 
Sovereignty is a much debated concept with different dimensions, the discussion of 
which falls beyond the scope of this paper.14 It, however, still largely remains the 
cornerstone of international law.15 In the traditional and widest sense it denotes the 
nation-state’s “… right to exercise … to the exclusion of any other state [or 
international organization], the functions of a state.”16 According to Brownlie, the 
notions of sovereignty and equality of states bear three main consequences:17 “(1) a 
jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive, over a territory and the permanent population living 
there; (2) a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other states; 
and (3) the dependence of obligations arising from customary law and treaties on the 
consent of the obligor”. The latter requires the state’s expression of its sovereignty to 
limit its jurisdiction under the former two consequences and to submit itself to external 
                                                          
14
 See, J. H. Jackson, “Sovereignty: Outdated Concept or New Approaches, in Redefining Sovereignty”,  
W. Shan et al. (eds.), Redefining sovereignty in international economic law (Hart Publishing, 2008), 3.  
15
 Ibid. 
16
 PCA, Island of Palmas Case, US v the Netherlands, Award of the Tribunal of 4 April 1928, 8. 
17
 J. Crawford, Brownlie’s principles of public international law, (Oxford Press, 8th ed., 2012) 289. 
According to Lowe, “what sovereignty signifies is not a defined, static body of rights and duties but a 
changing frame of reference in international relations, whose content is partly – perhaps largely – 
determined by factors and processes outside the law.” V. Lowe, “Sovereignty and International Economic 
Law”, W. Shan et al. (eds.), Redefining sovereignty in international economic law (Hart Publishing, 
2008), 77, 78. 
Published in Natural Resources Grabbing: An International Law Perspective, Eds. F Romanin 
Jacur, A Bonfanti, and F Seatzu (Brill Nijhoff 2015)  
 
 
standards and external courts and tribunals under IHRL and FIL. This section will 
elaborate on the allocation of power and authority on issues covered by IHRL and the 
FIL between the states and other relevant non-state actors. It will demonstrate the 
disproportionate shift of power and authority from states to non-state actors in IHRL 
and FIL. This shift results in non-state actors protected by FIL holding significantly 
more power than those protected under IHRL, which ultimately hinders the enforcement 
of IHRL when it clashes with FIL. 
 
2.1  Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
 
In the extractive industries, the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
both expands and constrains the state’s ability. Common Art. 1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) finds that the State, on behalf of its 
people, are “entitled to and endowed with the legal capacity to dispose freely of natural 
resources” in a territory.18 The state retains a permanent interest in the natural resources 
at all times, though it can assign or grant rights for identifying, mining, or cultivating 
the resources.19 The management of the extractive industry is therefore one more 
intimately linked to sovereignty. 
This authority of the state over its natural resources is constrained in the sense 
that it entails obligations for prudent natural resource management, both the resource 
itself and the income generated from the resource, which would enable the state to use 
                                                          
18
 N. Schrijver, Sovereignty over natural resources: balancing rights and duties (Cambridge University 
Press, 1997) 7. See also, L. Cotula, Human rights, natural resource and investment law in a globalised 
world: shades of grey in the shadow of the law (Routledge, 2012) 5; UN GA Resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty, para.1 declares “The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being 
of the people of the State concerned.” 
19
 For a more in-depth discussion of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, see, e.g., E. 
Duruigbo, “Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in International Law”, 
George Washington International Law Review 2006, 49;  K. N. Gess, “Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly  1964, 398.  
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its maximum available resources for realization of human rights and the wellbeing of its 
peoples.20  As Jack Donnelly argues “[s]overeignty is (only) the authority to decide, the 
right to choose among alternative courses of action the one that appears most beneficial 
or least harmful” for the peoples. Art. 2 of the ICESCR supports such an interpretation 
of the state’s purview as it obliges states to “take steps . . . to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights” in the Covenant.21  
 
2.2. Permanent Sovereignty, IHRL and FIL 
 
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources is exercised by the State on behalf of and 
for the benefit of the peoples. The doctrine does not entail a peremptory norm for 
exploitation of natural resources by states only, but rather it gives the power to the state 
to determine the way in which the sources will be exploited.22 In this sense, entering 
into an investment agreement for exploitation of natural resources or into an investment 
treaty granting protections to foreign investors is an exercise of the state’s sovereignty 
over its natural resources. However, once these instruments are entered into, they act as 
a limitation over the state’s authority to exploit those natural resources to the extent, and 
in the manner, provided in the particular instrument. Similarly, entering into IHRL 
obligations pertinent to natural resources is an exercise of state sovereignty, but once 
                                                          
20
 See Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights and State Sovereignty”, Human Rights and Welfare Working 
Papers, at 17 available at http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/workingpapers/2004/21-donnelly-2004.pdf; See 
also, E Duruigbo, “Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in International 
Law”, George Washington International Law Review 2006, 65 (arguing that “The right of peoples to 
sovereignty over natural resources necessarily imports an entitlement to demand that governments 
manage these resources to the maximum benefit of the people.”); L. A. Miranda, “The Role of 
International Law in Intrastate Natural Resource Allocation: Sovereignty, Human Rights and Peoples-
Based Development”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 2012, 800, (asserts that “the doctrine [of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources] possesses an intrastate dimension: one that was originally 
qualified as an obligation of the government of a state to its peoples as a whole.”) 
21
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 
entered into force 3 January 1976. 
22
 Schrijver, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, op.cit., para.23. 
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these obligations become binding they will act as a constraint over the state’s authority 
over its natural resources. 
The roots of both areas of law are found in the international law on state 
responsibility, and both “set[] minimum standards of protection . . . protect[ing] non-
state actors against arbitrary exercise of state sovereignty.”23 The two fields differ, 
though, in the focus of their protection and the expectation of equal treatment.24 
Between the late 1800s to the mid-1900s, the US and European home states sought to 
provide a higher level of protection for foreign investors than what was provided under 
the domestic laws of developing, principally post-colonial, states.25 Consequently, FIL 
demands discriminatory treatment in favour of foreign investors, providing “an 
internationally recognized legal framework to protect foreign investment which would 
give direct rights and standing to the investor vis-à-vis the host state” and a set of 
minimum standards that may mean foreign investors receive compensation for actions 
domestic citizens would not.26 IHRL, on the other hand, “aims to protect human 
dignity” and in doing so requires equality and non-discrimination.27 Whereas FIL 
permits demands on the state that favour investors based on their nationality, IHRL 
requires states to treat all within their territory or jurisdiction in a non-discriminatory 
manner, prohibiting deference based on nationality. 
While permanent sovereignty gives the states the right to formulate the legal 
framework applicable to natural resource exploitation, it is argued here that states are 
under an obligation to ensure that this framework adheres to the principle that the state’s 
sovereignty must be exercised by “choos[ing] among alternative courses of action the 
one that appears most beneficial or least harmful”.28 As a consequence, the state should 
strike the appropriate balance between FIL and IHRL when exercising its permanent 
sovereignty. This may require limitations imposed on investor rights by the state to 
                                                          
23
 Cotula, op.cit., 39. 
24
 Ibid.  
25
 Ibid. 39-40. 
26
 Sornarajah, The International Law On Foreign Investment  op.cit., 35, 37. 
27
 Cotula, op.cit., 40. 
28
 See, Schrijver, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources op.cit. 
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protect human rights of the local communities, or the limitation of land rights of the 
local community in order to enable the investor to conduct its business activities. 
Balancing the rights of the beneficiaries of these two areas requires an exercise of 
sovereignty by the state. In this sense, in the extractives sector the state is well situated 
to act as a barrier between the investor and the local communities whose rights and 
interests often clash. 
 
2.3 How does FIL Restrict States’ Ability to Implement their IHRL Obligations 
 
Investment contracts may trigger a shift of power and authority over the actions of the 
foreign investor relating to the investment within the host state.29 This is a shift that 
transfers the power and authority from the state to investors and international tribunals 
to different extents, depending on the content of the instrument, and therefore, acts as a 
constraint on the host state’s sovereignty, on its power to regulate. While the transfer of 
power and determination of its extent is an expression of sovereignty, once this shift 
takes place, the host state’s ability to exercise sovereignty vis-à-vis the foreign 
investment becomes restricted by the standards prescribed in the relevant instrument. 
Foreign investment law instruments diminish the ability of the state organs, including 
the executive, legislature and the courts to act in a manner contrary to the rules 
prescribed by these instruments.30  
Investment contracts can restrict the sovereignty of the host state in favour of 
private parties by stipulating legal or fiscal stabilization or by referring the settlement of 
disputes to international arbitration. For instance, art. 27(2) of the Qara Zaghan Gold 
Project Contract between Afghanistan and Afghan Krystal Natural Resources 
Company31 provides that “[a]ny future changes to existing Mineral Laws shall have no 
                                                          
29
 See, Cheng, “Authority and International Investment Law” op.cit., 469. 
30
 Ibid 481. 
31
 Accessible at http://mom.gov.af/Content/files/Mineral%20Contracts/File_211_QaraZaghan_Contract-
English.pdf 
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bearing on the terms, conditions or validity of this contract.” This constitutes a 
stabilization clause for the Mineral Laws of Afghanistan as it affects the investor.32 The 
2010 Minerals Law, which was in force at the conclusion of this contract,33 does not 
itself include a legal stabilization clause; however, the company will escape the stronger 
environmental or social protections that are found in the subsequent Minerals Law,34 
relying on the stabilization clause found in the investment contract.  As the duration of 
the contract is set for 10 years, any changes to the Minerals Law of Afghanistan within 
that period will be inapplicable to the Qara Zaghan project.  
While stabilization clauses restrict the state’s ability to enforce new regulation 
against the protected investor, international arbitration clauses require the state to 
submit itself to dispute settlement outside its own national courts. Investment treaty 
provisions often support and strengthen the conditions of investment set out in the 
investment contract. They can impose serious restrictions on the state’s ability to 
regulate in the extractive industries.35  
Even though the FIL instruments tend to restrict states’ ability to impose new 
conditions on investors, these instruments can only be created with state consent. Since 
the content of these instruments are formulated or negotiated by states,36 they give the 
                                                          
32
 On stabilization clauses, see, e.g., Cotula, op.cit., 4; J. Letnar Cernic, “Corporate Human Rights 
Obligations under Stabilization Clauses”, German Law Journal 2010, 210; A. Shemberg, Stabilization 
Clauses and Human Rights: A Research Project conducted for the IFC and the United Nations Special 
Representative to the Secretary General on Business and Human Rights (2008), available at 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/9feb5b00488555eab8c4fa6a6515bb18/Stabilization%2BPaper.pdf?
MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=9feb5b00488555eab8c4fa6a6515bb18 
33
 A new Minerals Law was passed in 16 August 2014.  
34
 For instance, art. 92 of the 2014 Minerals Law requires license holders to enter into Community 
Development Agreements “for the purpose of assisting the local communities affected by Mineral 
Activities in order to promote sustainable local economic development, the general welfare and quality of 
life of the local communities, recognizing and respecting the rights, customs and traditions of local 
communities.” 
35
 26 per cent of all cases submitted to ICSID up to date since the inception of the centre were related to 
disputes in the oil and gas and mining industries. See ICSID Caseload and Statistics, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202015-
1%20%28English%29%20%282%29_Redacted.pdf  
36
 The content of national laws or investment contracts may be influenced by requirements of loan 
conditionality on creating a favourable investment framework imposed by international financial 
institutions. However, as mentioned earlier, there is no evidence that applying stricter environmental and 
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necessary flexibility to the state to implement their human rights obligations at the 
formulation or negotiation stage. On this theoretical background on the interaction of 
sovereignty, IHRL and FIL, the following sections will focus on the demands of IHRL 
regarding business activity and the ways in which these could be incorporated into 
investment contracts.  
 
3 The Potential Impact of the UN Guiding Principles  
 
To date, the international community’s focus on business and human rights has 
primarily been aimed at examining the impact of foreign investment and in particular of 
multinational corporations (‘MNCs’) on human rights and suggesting or creating soft-
law mechanisms for remedying those impacts.37 This is understandable as most foreign 
investment, though not all, comes in the form of investments from multinational 
corporations.38 Currently, the leading framework for responsibilities in the area of 
business and human rights is the UN Guiding Principles, which recognizes a tripartite 
division of responsibility for governing the human rights impacts of corporations.39 
States are to protect human rights from impacts by corporations, businesses are to 
respect human rights in their activities, and both states and businesses are to ensure 
negative human rights impacts are remedied.40 This section will outline the 
responsibilities recognized in the Guiding Principles while suggesting that they also 
                                                                                                                                                                          
social standards deter investments in resource extraction.  Therefore, there is no reason for states to adopt 
lax environmental and social regulation to fulfil the loan conditionality. 
37
 J. G. Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda”, American Journal of 
International Law, 2007, 819; see, also, e. g., UN Guiding Principles, op.cit., para. 1; Report of the UN 
Special Representative to the Secretary General on Business and Human Rights, Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 paras. 1-3, (2008) 
(“Framework”); OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf  (“OECD Guidelines”); see also, C. de la Vega, et al., 
Holding Businesses Accountable for Human Rights Violations: Recent Developments and Next Steps, 2-3 
(Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, July 2011), available at http://library.fes.de/. 
38
 Sornarajah, The International Law On Foreign Investment, op.cit., 60. 
39
 UN Guiding Principles, op.cit. 
40
 Ibid. 
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offer a tool for better explaining and guiding the integration of human rights in FIL 
instruments.  
The UNGPs draw on the traditional understanding of a state’s responsibility 
within human rights: respect, protect, and fulfil.41 Ruggie’s alteration to this topology 
has been criticized,42 but it was a clear attempt to harmonize his framework with 
international law.43 It is with this approach in mind that the UNGPs’ division of labour 
forms the underpinning of the recommendations in this Chapter. The power of the host 
state to exercise regulatory controls in the extractive industries is restricted by 
investment contracts, international investment treaties and domestic laws on investment 
or natural resources, but only to the extent it consents to. The state’s obligation to 
protect human rights against the negative impacts from extractive investments requires 
the state to construct its investment consent in a way that allows it to meet its 
obligations on a continual basis. Embedding the responsibilities recognized in the 
UNGPs can help the state realize its human rights obligations while pursuing foreign 
investors for its extractive industries. The next section considers how this can be done in 
the extractive industry. 
The burden of the UNGPs rests on States, which are required to regulate 
corporate behavior regardless of their capacity to do so.44 The UNGPs were drafted with 
the recognition that states may be unable or unwilling to exercise the necessary control 
over corporate actors,45 yet they still recognize an obligation on states to “[e]nsure that 
other laws and policies governing the creation and ongoing operation of business 
enterprises, such as corporate law, do not constrain but enable respect for human 
                                                          
41
 See, I. E. Koch, “Dichotomies, Trichotomies or Waves of Duties”, Human Rights Law Review 2005, 
103; Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Rights Submitted by Mr. Asbjørn Eide, Special 
Rapporteur, U.N. Doc.  E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23, para 66 (1987); M. M. Sepúlveda Carmona, The nature of 
the obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia, 
2003) 157,162. 
42
 See, e.g., Letnar Cernic, op.cit., 1269. 
43
 See, Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda”, 838. 
44
 See, Framework, op.cit., paras 47-49. 
45
 See, ibid., para 14; see also, Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International 
Agenda”, 830. 
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rights.”46 This proves difficult if human rights are isolated within the state’s legal or 
policy framework. An integrated approach that embeds human rights protections within 
the other legal provisions is necessary to ensure “departments and agencies which 
directly shape business practices” are apprised of the state’s obligations and find it 
within their capacity to consider human rights.47 
Applying the UNGPs to the extractive industry, the state is expected to provide 
policy coherence between IHRL and the terms and conditions of investment contracts. 
States should ensure provisions do not allow or facilitate a business’s negative impact 
on human rights. The state must not relinquish its ability to adopt new human rights 
compliant legislation or new regulations, or enforce those standards on the business. 
Where negative impacts are an inherent part of the operation, the state is expected to 
require advanced planning for addressing these impacts in a human rights compliant 
manner, including the provision of compensation for impacted individuals and 
communities. Finally, where the business has had an unforeseen negative impact, the 
contract must not exempt the business from local courts or from an obligation to pay 
compensation.  
Businesses, on the other hand, have a responsibility to respect human rights even 
where the State fails to regulate. The UNGPs advance a ‘do no harm’ philosophy which 
places the corporation’s obligations primarily in negative terms: the corporation should 
not interfere with the enjoyment of a human right, and should avoid complicity when a 
state violates human rights.48 In addressing these demands, businesses are expected to 
undertake due diligence to determine the risks they pose to human rights, and to 
establish grievance mechanisms for addressing complaints about human rights 
                                                          
46
 UNGPs, op.cit., para. 3. 
47
 Framework, op.cit., paras 35-41; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, J. Ruggie, 
Business and Human Rights: First Steps Towards Operationalization of ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27, para 18 (2010). 
48
 Framework, op.cit., paras 24, 54-64, 73. 
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violations.49 In advance of signing a contract, businesses should conduct due diligence 
on the impact of their operations and establish means for addressing grievances. 
Respecting human rights, though, also demands that businesses not seek exemptions 
from the state’s human rights laws, or pressure the state to avoid seeking new human 
rights compliant regulations.50 Finally, due diligence must not simply be conducted 
before an investment, but should function as a continuous part of the business’s 
operations.51 
While businesses are expected to create non-judicial mechanisms by which they 
can resolve complaints by individuals and communities harmed by their actions,52 the 
burden for ensuring corporations meet their obligations rests with the territorial host 
state. While the UNGPs reflect a voluntary framework for businesses – noting a 
responsibility, not an obligation or duty to respect human rights – the expectation is that 
the host state will work to ensure enforcement of the corporation’s responsibility. Home 
states may also regulate the activities of their corporations abroad,53 but the UNGPs 
indicate an expectation that the actions taken by a territorial host state in line with its 
duty to protect will lead to a clear framework of binding expectations on the 
corporation’s responsibility to respect human rights. This has been appropriately 
criticized elsewhere as not reflecting the full obligations of a state,54 but it does 
emphasize the importance of host states’ laws embedding the duty to protect and the 
corporation’s responsibility to respect human rights in a clear and integrated framework. 
In this sense, the UNGPs recognize that human rights act as a constraint on sovereignty 
while also expecting the state to utilize its sovereignty in restraining corporate impacts 
on human rights through, inter alia, FIL. 
                                                          
49
 See, UNGPs, Principles 17-21 and accompanying commentary; see also, R. Lindsay et al., “Human 
Rights in the Oil and Gas Sector: Applying the UN Guiding Principles”, Journal of World Energy Law 
and Business 2013, 18, 21. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 UNGPs, Principle 17, Commentary. 
52
 UNGPs, Principle 28; see also, Lindsay, et al., op.cit., 31.  
53
 See, UNGPs, Principle 2 and Commentary.  
54
 See, N. Jagers, “UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making Headway Towards 
Real Corporate Accountability?”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2011, 159, 161. 
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4. Incorporating the UNGPs into Investment Contracts 
 
This section considers ways in which the UN Guiding Principles can be 
incorporated, utilizing the example of the Qara Zaghan Contract.55 Investment contracts 
can initially make an explicit reference to the UN Guiding Principles or to human rights 
as a specific term. The Qara Zaghan Contract, for instance, provides in art. 29 that the 
investor will manage its operations in a “technically, financially, socially, culturally and 
environmentally responsible manner to achieve the environmental protection and 
sustainable development objectives and responsibilities required by” the Contract and 
the laws of Afghanistan but also “any applicable international conventions to which 
Afghanistan is a signatory.” This could allow for Afghanistan to consider its 
international environmental and human rights obligations when interpreting the 
provisions of this contract.  However, the wording of this entire subsection is not very 
strong and is slightly confusing. It is unclear how an interpreting court or tribunal would 
apply this provision in light of the Mineral Law stabilization clause in art. 27(2) of the 
Contract. Integrating the UNGPs into investment contracts, though, needs to be more 
comprehensive than a simple acknowledgment of the UNGPs or human rights within 
the contract. Instead, the principles of the UN Guiding Principles need to be embedded 
throughout the instrument, in order for the state to fulfill its duty to protect. 
As John Ruggie recognized, investment can touch on a large variety of human 
rights. Investment contracts can be improved to include very direct provisions for the 
protection of specific human rights most relevant to that specific field. With the 
extractive industries, past cases indicate states need to be particularly concerned about 
the following issues: indigenous and minority rights; freedom from detention and 
torture; freedom of expression and association; freedom of religion; right to an adequate 
                                                          
55
 This section focuses on incorporating the UNGPs into one type of investment protection instrument: 
investment contracts. International investment treaties and national laws on resource extraction and 
investment promotion are also an important component of FIL, but due to space constraints, the analysis 
necessary to address the specifics of treaties and national laws is not included here. 
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standard of living; right to health; cultural rights; property rights; and the right to an 
adequate remedy.56 This piece cannot address all of these issues, so it focuses on 
contract provisions in the extractive industries that interfere with right to property and 
right to an adequate standard of living. 
Investment contracts establish the special legal framework within which the 
investor will carry out exploitation of natural resources. The investment contract will 
normally operate within and comply with the laws of the host state, including its 
investment treaty commitments. In the extractive industries, contracts typically include 
provisions on the rights and obligations of both the government and the license holders 
throughout their license period, dispute settlement, termination clauses, and fiscal 
aspects of resource extraction. While these areas appear relevant only to the relationship 
between the investor and the state, the issues covered by them may interfere with the 
enjoyment of third parties’ human rights. Third party individuals that are most 
significantly affected by oil, gas and mining activities typically include the members of 
local communities living at or around the resource site and the labour force involved. 
Natural resource extraction may impact the right to property and right to an adequate 
standard of living in a variety of ways. Conducting business in this industry may require 
removal of local communities from their lands, which would interfere with their 
livelihoods. Communities may lose shelter, food and water resources due to their 
removal from land. Activities of a mining or an oil and gas company may cause 
contamination of air, water and soil, which would negatively impact the food and water 
sources as well as the health of the communities. These adverse impacts could be also 
created by the suppliers or subcontractors of the foreign investor.  
Investment contracts may be silent on the potential impact of the investor’s 
activities on the human rights of third parties or may provide inadequate safeguards. In 
order to avoid or mitigate the adverse consequences, contracts may include certain 
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 See, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97, para 
25 (2006). 
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provisions, obliging the company and the relevant public authorities to act or not to act 
in a particular way. However, the formulation and implementation of these provisions 
are of utmost importance, if they are to achieve the necessary protection. Otherwise, 
they will fail to satisfy the expectations of the human rights obligations of the host state. 
The following section will demonstrate how provisions of a contract are relevant to the 
protection of human rights by looking at Qara Zaghan Contract. The adequacy of the 
provisions of this contract will be investigated with specific focus on right to property 
and right to an adequate standard of living. 
 
4.1. Right to Property, Land Use and Right to an Adequate Standard of Living 
 
The impact of oil, gas and mining activities are strongly felt on communities’ 
right to property and right to an adequate standard of living. These projects often 
involve resettlement of communities, which directly interferes with their use of land and 
thus with their property rights in connection with that their right to housing and food. 
The right to property is guaranteed in art. 17 of the UDHR57 and in regional human 
rights instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights58 (art. 1 of 
Protocol I), art. 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights59 and art. 21 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights.60 Under the European system the right to 
property has been interpreted in a broad manner to cover “all manner of things which 
have an economic value”61 while the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognizes 
interests beyond mere ownership of property.62 Wide interpretation of property rights 
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 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948. UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) 
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 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR)). 
59
 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into 
force 21 October 1986). 
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 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) (adopted 21 November 1969, entered into force 18 
July 1978).  
61
 C. Ovey and R. C.A. White, The European Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford University Press, 4th 
ed., 2006), 350. 
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 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua Judgment of August 31, 
2001, (Ser. C) No. 79 (2001), para.144. 
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extends the protection guaranteed in these instruments to individual or collective 
occupants or users of land who do not hold the title to the land.63 Removal from land 
will deprive communities from use of land for shelter, production of food and other 
means for generation of income, such as artisanal mining. This interferes with property 
rights, as well as depriving communities from their means of subsistence, adversely 
impacting their livelihood and at times their cultural rights. 
Contracts relating to oil, gas and mining activities should be drafted in a way to 
prevent or minimize any adverse impacts of the business activities on the communities’ 
livelihood. Safeguards should be incorporated to each stage of the oil, gas and mining 
activity stretching from the pre-licensing stage to post expiration or termination of the 
license. The main considerations of the host state negotiators related to use of land 
should be community consultation and consent, compensation and terms of 
resettlement. These issues are analyzed in turn below. 
 
4.2. Consent and Community Consultation 
 
The first step to achieving human rights protection in oil, gas and mining projects is to 
engage with communities at every stage of the project through an open consultation 
process. The international standards require not only consultation, but also ‘consent’ for 
natural resource extraction in areas populated by indigenous peoples. Free, prior and 
informed consent (‘FPIC’)64 is the standard found in the UN Declaration on the Rights 
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 In many African countries, land is owned by the state and used or occupied by the people based on 
customary system of property rights. See, Cotula, op.cit., 19-20. 
64
 According to UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free Prior and Informed Consent, Free refers to a 
consent given voluntarily and absent of “coercion, intimidation or manipulation.”; Prior means “consent 
is sought sufficiently in advance of any authorization or commencement of activities.”; Informed refers 
mainly to the nature of the engagement and type of information that should be provided prior to seeking 
consent and also as part of the ongoing consent process.; Consent refers to the collective decision made 
by the rights-holders and reached through the customary decision-making processes of the affected 
peoples or communities. Consent must be sought and granted or withheld according to the unique formal 
or informal political-administrative dynamic of each community, available at http://www.un-
redd.org/Launch_of_FPIC_Guidlines/tabid/105976/Default.aspx 
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of Indigenous Peoples. According to art. 10 of the Declaration, indigenous peoples 
cannot be removed from their lands without obtaining FPIC. This standard is also found 
in instruments considered as benchmarks such as the The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention,65 IFC Performance Standards,66 International Bar Association’s Model 
Mining Development Agreement67 and the World Bank Policy on Involuntary 
Resettlement. Beyond the rights of the indigenous peoples, the last three instruments 
recognize the right of the affected non-indigenous communities to informed 
consultation and participation at every stage of the project that interferes with their 
rights on land.68 These standards on community consultation and consent should be 
incorporated into investment contracts. 
In Afghanistan, a country sitting on vast valuable mineral deposits,69 the 2010 
Minerals Law does not include any clear provisions on public consultation and consent 
process.70 The Qara Zaghan Contract, which is governed by this law, also does not 
require the parties to carry out public consultation prior to commencement of the 
exploitation of the mine. Art. 7 implies that the exploitation license has been granted but 
cannot be proceeded with until the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP) accepts 
the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and the Environmental and 
Social Management Plan (ESMP).71 Pursuant to art. 7(1), the MoMP has to accept or 
reject the Feasibility Study, which contains the ESIA and the ESMP within a month 
after submission. This does not give sufficient time to the MoMP for effective 
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 ILO Convention No.169, at art. 16, entry into force 5 September 1991. 
66
 Performance Standard 7. 
67
 Available at http://www.mmdaproject.org/ 
68
 See for instance the IFC Performance Standard 1 
69
 K. Mahr, Treasure Land: The Mines of Afghanistan by Yuri Kozyrev, Time Lightbox (29 August 
2013).  
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 There is no clear provisions on community consultation in the 2014 Minerals Law either. It vaguely 
refers to a consultation with local communities in preparation of the Community Development Plan. The 
Law does not contain details on the procedure and the standards to be followed. These are left to the 
regulations which are not available on th website of the Ministry of Mines.  
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 Pursuant to art. 7(1)(E) the ESMP will address: “i. the environmental impact as noted in the ESIA and 
mitigating the effects to the environment and include measures to safeguard the environment from 
unnecessary damage; ii. the social impacts as found in the ESIA and what measures will be taken to 
mitigate the negative impact of the proposed mining to the local populations. The plan will outline 
development projects to assist the local peoples in social development; iii. the health and safety of the 
employees as detailed in a Health and Safety Plan” 
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consultation with affected populations. It is unclear whether the ESIA and ESMP have 
requirements that will make it conducive to human rights. It is also unclear from the 
contract, if the community in the area around the mine was already consulted regarding 
the plans for mine development or during the preparation of the ESIA and the ESMP. 
This is exacerbated by art. 7(2) which deprives the MoMP from revoking the license if 
it is not convinced about the company’s ability to avoid the bad impacts of its intended 
activity from the feasibility study. Instead, under art. 7(2) it must “…. cooperate with 
AKNR to remediate the concerns resulting in the rejection.” 
In order to comply with its duty to protect under the UNGPs, states must ensure 
that their investment contracts contain provisions requiring the affected community to 
be consulted, pursuant to the internationally recognized standards, throughout the 
development of the project by both the state and the investor at relevant stages and 
allowed to provide insight into how to mitigate the harm they will face from the project. 
The state should also reserve the right to suspend or revoke the license, if the investor is 
in serious breach of the consultation requirements. 
 
4.3. Compensation and Terms of Resettlement 
 
Interference with property rights are typically compensated monetarily. Some laws also 
include the option of resettlement as a form of reparation, where affected communities 
have to be removed from the land. In cases where communities or individuals are 
removed from land, compensation alone may not be the most appropriate remedy. 
Removal from land, in particular for rural communities, may cause loss of shelter, food, 
income sources and cultural attachment. As others have noted “displacement caused by 
development largely occurs in a manner that violates human rights and leads to the 
increased impoverishment of the displaced.”72 Resettlement and compensation is a 
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Resettlement: Submission to the World Bank Safeguards Review, 2, (2013), available at 
Published in Natural Resources Grabbing: An International Law Perspective, Eds. F Romanin 
Jacur, A Bonfanti, and F Seatzu (Brill Nijhoff 2015)  
 
 
complex issue, but the harmed individuals need to have a range of options available for 
reparation, not simply financial compensation.  
Restitution has long been the preferred method for redressing loss of land as a 
result of widespread armed conflict or human rights abuse.73 Where restitution is 
impossible, though, human rights law calls for a combination of responses to violations 
and negative impacts. The Van Boven-Bassiouni Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law make it 
clear that where restitution is impossible, reparations must include the combination of 
substantive reparations most aptly suited for redressing the violations and returning the 
individual to a state as close as possible to what they would have enjoyed had the harm 
not occurred in the first place.74 This may include social and legal rehabilitation.75 The 
investor and/or the state need to ensure an opportunity for social rehabilitation, either 
through the reconstruction of a community via relocation or additional social support 
through integration into new communities, adapting the economic skills of the 
community, or other forms of ensuring the social welfare of the individuals harmed. 
It is important to note that the World Bank recognizes resettlement as 
“depending on the case, include[ing] (a) acquisition of land and physical structures on 
the land, including businesses; (b) physical relocation; and (c) economic rehabilitation 
of displaced persons (DPs), to improve (or at least restore) income and living 
standards.”76 It also recognizes that resettlement should be “avoided where feasible” 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Reforming-the-World-Bank-Policy-
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because “resettlement can be severely harmful to people and their communities.”77 
While the World Bank’s policy seems to recognize a wide range of possible responses 
under the heading of “resettlement,” the obligation for redressing human rights impacts 
requires the option that is most responsive to the victim’s needs. Consequently, it is not 
the investor, the financer or the state that should be determining the restitution on its 
own, but rather resettlement and rehabilitation again need to be considered in 
consultation with the victims. As such, adequate laws will ensure the wide range of 
options for remedies and reparations, instead of simply dictating compensation as an 
adequate standard. The obligation to recognize the range of reparations is not solely on 
the state, as businesses also have a responsibility to remedy impacts,78 but this article is 
specifically addressing the obligations of the state. The state can transfer the burden of 
rehabilitation and restitution to the licensee in the legislation but a truly human rights-
compliant act would require this broader range of potential reparations also be imputed 
to the state. 
The Qara Zaghan Contract does not include any provision on remedies for loss 
of land. It provides in art. 29 that the MoM shall provide the land and rights of way 
necessary for the operation of the investor and grant exclusive rights to use such land; 
however, it does not specify the conditions for obtaining this land and remedying its 
potential impacts on the local communities.  
Since the contract is governed by the Laws of Afghanistan, the 2010 Minerals 
Law can fill in the gaps where the contract fails to address an issue. The 2010 Minerals 
Law provides that land can be expropriated for mining activities in accordance with the 
law, but does not specifically refer to compensation.79 Exploitation license holders are 
required to submit an Environmental Impact Assessment and an Environment 
Management Plan, which includes measures for resettlement or compensation of 
affected communities and issuance of financial bond by the holder to guarantee its 
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obligations towards the affected communities.80 Besides a reference to international best 
practice,81 no specific guidelines are included in the mining regulations as to the 
conduct of resettlement. It is further provided, in art. 66, that the license holder shall 
compensate third parties for damage caused as a result of its activities. The procedure 
for and evaluation of compensation is laid out in arts. 91 and 92 of the Mining 
Regulations, which include compensation for damage to property, land, infrastructures, 
livestock and crops. 
  The contract itself need not include detailed provisions on how the remedies 
provided will be implemented, if these are already addressed in the national law. The 
contract can simply refer to the national law provisions. If the applicable national law 
does not have the appropriate provisions, like the Afghan Minerals Law, the contract 
should incorporate the international standards found in the documents such as the IFC 
Performance Standards, IBA’s MMDA or the World Bank’s standards on involuntary 
resettlement, In any case, the contract shall ensure that removal of communities from 
land is conducted in compliance with the internationally accepted standards.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
While FIL instruments are both an expression and constraint on the sovereign interests, 
the state’s ability to enact investment protections is in turn constrained by its human 
rights commitments. By embedding the UN Guiding Principles into FIL, states can 
begin to adapt a comprehensive and integrated approach to their responsibility to protect 
human rights against negative impacts caused by foreign investment. Investment 
contracts play an important role in providing privileges and guarantees to investors, but 
they can also have an important role to play in advancing human rights protection from 
impacts of business activities. This piece has examined the Qara Zaghan Contract as a 
case study to identify good practices and current weaknesses in states’ approach to 
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human rights issues in their investment contracts. It is only a limited contribution to the 
effort of identifying best practices and more comprehensive research needs to occur. 
 As discussed in this Chapter, the Qara Zaghan Contract was tied to 
Afghanistan’s 2010 Minerals Law, limiting the ability of the state to protect human 
rights on an on-going basis. That law did not require community consultation, did not 
adequately address the economic and social rights of affected communities, and relies 
heavily on resettlement rather than preferred forms of remedies for affected 
communities. Since the contract, Afghanistan has adopted a new law, which appears to 
better take into account the needs of affected communities,82 but as these developments 
will not help the individuals and communities affected by operations agreed to in the 
Qara Zaghan Contract, the case sits as a cautionary tale not just for Afghanistan but 
other states. If states are to meet their human rights obligations, their FIL must make 
clear the investors’ obligations to respect human rights, provide adequate substantive 
and procedural remedies for affected individuals and communities, and allow the state 
to continually develop their human rights standards. 
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